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Abstract 
This article offers a critical review of how migrant smuggling arises out of restrictive migration 
policies and how it has become increasingly sophisticated and professionalized. Reflecting on 
the innovative empirical findings presented in the contributions to this volume of The ANNALS, I 
highlight how migration control has hardened borders, disrupted cross-border flows of goods and 
people, and transformed local economies. Understanding better the relationship between 
migration control policies and migrant smuggling and the social and moral nature of the agent-
customer transactions has important implications for the policies adopted to address irregular 
migration and migrant smuggling on both sides of the Atlantic. 
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Migrant smuggling is commonly represented through images of desperate people crossing 
inhospitable territories, notably the Arizona Desert from Mexico to the United States, and the 
Sahara Desert from Niger to Libya or Algeria, and of course the Mediterranean Sea to the Italian 
or Greek shores. Migrant smugglers are often portrayed in the media as callous criminals who 
send derelict and overcrowded dinghies across the Mediterranean. Or as unscrupulous coyotes 
who do not hesitate to abandon their customers-victims in the desert. The common element in 
these representations is death, abuse, severe deceit, and exploitation. Smugglers are portrayed as 
the perpetrators of criminal acts for profit. They benefit from the poor and vulnerable of the 
world who seek a better life and work opportunities in foreign countries. Their customers, the 
migrants, are seen as victims of ruthless criminal networks (Kyle and Koslowski 2001; European 
Commission 2015). This volume of The ANNALS goes against this conventional wisdom and 
dominant media discourse to argue that migrant smuggling is a complex phenomenon, that 
portraying smugglers as criminals and migrants as their victims oversimplifies a nuanced 
relationship, and that we need to think harder and dig deeper into realities on the ground, not 
least through qualitative empirical research and through comparative analysis, to understand the 
relationship between migrant smuggling and migration control policies.  
The aim of this policy article is to review how migrant smuggling arises out of restrictive 
migration policies and how it has become increasingly sophisticated and professionalized. 
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Reflecting on the innovative empirical findings presented in the contributions to this volume of 
The ANNALS, I highlight how migration control has hardened borders, disrupted cross border 
flows of goods and people, and transformed local economies. While the “smuggling business” 
turnover has dramatically increased, previously custom passeurs have turned to professionalized 
and well-equipped networks. In addition, I seek to illustrate how monetary transactions are 
embedded in wider systems of social relationships and what several of the authors contributing to 
this volume (e.g. Achilli, Maher, Majidi, Brachet, Ayalew) conceptualize as moral economies 
and wider systems of social relationships. While these relationships by no means justify the work 
of migrant smugglers they point to the relevance of historical patterns (see for instance Stone-
Cadena and Velasco, this volume) and to the wider economic and political factors that play a part 
in migrations (see for instance Majidi, but also Ayalew and Gonzalez). Understanding better the 
relationship between migration control policies and migrant smuggling and the social and moral 
nature of the agent-customer transactions has important implications for the policies adopted to 
address irregular migration and migrant smuggling on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 
Irregular Migration and Migrant Smuggling 
The causes of irregular migration broadly lie in the intersection among people’s search for life 
prospects, labor market demand, and restrictive immigration controls. This is of course no news 
in the study of international migration and yet there is something qualitatively different about 
migration today by comparison to the early twentieth century and even to the 1970s or 1980s. 
While globalization has intensified, integrating all countries into a global economy, expanding 
trade, intensifying communication, and making distant production systems interdependent, one 
of its naturally ensuing phenomena, notably the movement of people, is increasingly stiffened 
and restricted. In this sense, we may argue that irregular migration and migrant smuggling are 
phenomena of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. This does not imply that there 
were no cross-border flows prior to this time or that all such flows were documented. It signals 
that hard territorial and digital1 borders have started solidifying mostly since the 1970s and 
particularly in the last 20 years. This has codified flows as irregular/illegal (see also Düvell 
2006) and led to the emergence of social and criminal networks aimed at facilitating cross border 
movement where movement is not legally authorized (Massey et al 2017; Salt and Stein 1997; 
Triandafyllidou and Maroukis 2012). In other words, we need to reconceptualize irregular 
migration as a structural feature of late-modern society rather than as an exception or social 
pathology.  
Migrant smuggling emerges when and where borders are fixed, relatively impermeable, 
and protected by a border bureaucracy, which includes border crossing points, border guards, 
passport controls, entry visas, and stamps on one’s passport when entering or leaving a country 
(Mountz 2010). This bureaucracy involves a range of border actors including not only state 
authorities and border guards but also nongovernmental organizations, international 
organizations, and of course migrant smuggling and human trafficking networks. Thus, people 
who wish to move to a new country without appropriate authorization may organize their trip on 
their own or with the help of family and friends based at the country of transit or destination but 
also increasingly rely on specialized networks of facilitators, passeurs, coyotes, handlers, or also 
scaffisti. This happens as a direct consequence of the very mechanisms and instruments 
mobilized to control borders.  The higher the hurdles the more professionalized the assistance 
unauthorized migrants (and asylum seekers) will need.  
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As Kyle and Koslowski (2001, 5) argued more than a decade ago, the smuggling of 
migrants into countries where they are not allowed to enter is not new, what is new is the global 
spread and development of the phenomenon. Sixteen years later, in 2017, there has been a 
development of the human smuggling and trafficking networks in the breadth and size of their 
criminal activities and business turnover – notably the amount of money involved in these two 
sectors as fees paid or profit made from these two activities – and a growth in the concern of 
governments and international organizations in combating these two related phenomena. Indeed 
the smuggling of migrants in general, as well as into Europe in particular, has been a priority for 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and its special antismuggling and 
antitrafficking training programs. Trafficking in human beings, an issue closely related to human 
smuggling, has also become a priority2 for international organizations such as the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM). Most recently, the EU created a special office within 
EUROPOL called the European Migrant Smuggling Centre.3  
 
The Challenge for Policy 
Increasing restrictions on migration or asylum seeking risks perpetuating a vicious circle: the 
restrictions generate irregular migration, increasing the risks and costs to migrants and their 
dependence on smuggling networks, the latter of which turn to more sophisticated methods to 
avoid controls, and hence of course provide reasons for even more restrictions and heightened 
controls. In addition, irregular migration routes and smuggling activities further blur the 
distinction between different categories of migrants, as asylum seekers and economically 
motivated migrants share the same routes, services, and networks (Van Liempt 2007, 14; Koser 
2010; Van Hear, Brubaker, and Besa 2009).  
There are four distinct issues that cast light on the dynamics of this vicious circle. First, 
borders that used to be formal but very permeable are being hardened, disrupting and 
transforming cross border exchanges and movements. Second, migrant facilitation activities 
should be understood as embedded in local economies, often through the involvement of local 
“travel” agents of various sorts. Third, these loose networks operate through a combination of 
economic motivation and profit, as well as social meanings of trust and community in a highly 
insecure environment that needs to be appraised in all its complexity to effectively understand 
the roots of migrant smuggling. Fourth, the increased restrictions and police violence at the 
border and in transit leads to the transformation of such loose networks to more professionalized, 
organized and, indeed, criminal networks. While open borders may not be viable, the current 
emphasis on border securitization and externalization of controls to transit countries 
(neighboring and more distant to the United States and the EU) contributes to the 
professionalization and criminalization of smuggling networks while it does not stop irregular 
migration flows because the motivations to migrate, both economic and political, are too strong. 
There is an urgent need for a more comprehensive approach that mainstreams local economic 




First, borders that used to be formal but permeable are being hardened, disrupting and 
transforming cross border exchanges and movements. Brachet (this volume) highlights the 
dynamics of the cross Saharan flows of goods, which also includes transporting people across 
Niger to Libya. The city of Agadez was a main transit point, a traditional stop for old caravan 
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routes, that was buzzing as a stopover for trucks that would transport goods back and forth. 
Prospective irregular migrants would speak directly to these lorry drivers and arrange prices for 
their transportation. Both the lorry drivers and the migrants would see this as an informal 
transportation service rather than as an unauthorized border crossing. West Africans seeking 
employment in Algeria and Libya usually took this migratory route; only a few among them 
would end up farther north to attempt a crossing into Europe (Pliez 2003). The truck drivers who 
would today qualify as migrant smugglers were understood, according to Brachet, as traders.  
However, the breakdown of the Khaddafi regime in Libya has created lawlessness and 
chaos, and disrupted the national economy that was the source of employment for West African 
migrants. Thus, migration has moved farther north through the Mediterranean, to Europe. 
European countries have responded by improving their sea border controls and by externalizing 
migration controls to transit countries. Thus, as Brachet so aptly explains, the border between 
Niger and Libya and Algeria has been hardened and the governments of those countries 
pressured to tighten border controls. International organizations opened local offices to manage 
cross border movement. Police and border forces were pressured to change tactics, stopping and 
controlling lorries. Passing became more risky, bribes increased, and the means of transport 
changed. Cross-border movement shifted from informal to clandestine. Drivers of commercial 
lorries were no longer willing to run the risk of carrying irregular migrant workers. However, 
security guards from the gold mines near Agadez were ready to step in to transport migrants. 
Informal travel agencies closed and migration facilitation became more organized; more 
expensive; riskier, as it had to cross through desert points rather than formal border crossings; 
and more violent, as local police and military forces in Niger sought to stop the flows. New laws 
criminalized facilitation and transportation of migrants. 
A similar process has been taking place in Mexico, as Guevara Gonzalez illustrates in 
this volume. Pressures on Mexico to control Central American migration through the country 
toward the United States has led to the tightening of Mexican borders and the criminalization of 
informal movements. In this case, the border has become an internal boundary. Migration 
controls take place rat public places such as through random controls at highways and in public 
squares, or bus and train stations or even on board in the trains. The journey has become 
particularly risky and unsafe (see also Sanchez 2015), which has increased the need for migrants 
to hire professional smugglers. This need has contributed to the professionalization of smuggler 
services. Guevara Gonzalez points to how migrant services are now divided between the local 
guides who cover short legs of a longer journey, and the coyotes who facilitate irregular 
migration on to the United States.  Guevara Gonzalez shows how these practices lead to what 
Collyer (2010, 275) has termed “fragmented journeys.” Notably the transit takes more time and 
more money, and it often involves interruptions due to bad health, running out of money, being 
arrested and detained, and being sent back and moving forward again.  
Disrupting local economies 
Tightening the borders does combat migrant smuggling networks, but it does not address 
the local economic dynamics that support the services of smugglers. As Achilli (this volume) 
suggests, the EU-Turkey statement and joint action plan, as well as the initial conception of 
Operation Sophia (aimed at destroying boats and dismantling smuggling networks), temporarily 
tackled migrant flows out of Turkey, but they did not address either the root causes of or the 
local economic factors in migration. Notably, the large number of small shop owners who were 
making a living by selling life jackets and related gear, the car owners who helped with 
transportation of “customers”, also the owners of houses and hotels in the areas near the port of 
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Mersin or Izmir where Syrians and others stayed before boarding the boats to Greece. These 
actors do not qualify as criminals but they have created the habitus within which migrant 
smuggling or facilitation takes place. As Achilli, Brachet, and Guevara Gonzalez illustrate in this 
volume, smuggling provides for such side-jobs and thus has its own socioeconomic dynamic.  
Brachet further emphasizes this point by noting that in the Sahel such services were not 
always labeled as illegal and are still not considered criminal to this day. Money paid to stay at 
provisional shelters or to buy food and supplies and even the bribes paid to police and border 
guards were fed into the local economy, indirectly undermining any motivation to turn to 
criminal activities, such as that existing today. While the EU and the United States are spending 
millions to support border controls, to open international organization offices, and to build 
capacity in transit countries, they are at the same time taking away valuable sources of cash for 
local communities. It is unclear whether government funding to build migration control capacity 
and setting up local IOM or Frontex branches is feeding in any way into the local economies or 
rather exacerbating local and regional inequality. 
 
Profit and trust: Complex morality 
Economic motivations and profit, as well as social meanings of trust and community in a 
highly insecure environment, need to be taken into account to fully understand migration 
facilitation. Moving away from a simple understanding of migrant as victim and smuggler as 
criminal, contributions to this volume highlight the complex system of trust, interdependence, 
community ties, and profit that is used during the smuggling process. There are several important 
findings in this volume that help us to understand the complex “morality” of smuggling. 
First, initial contact with and choosing the smuggler take place within the community, 
through the recommendation of other migrants and through relatives and co-villagers. Second, 
the smuggler and migrant face hardships together during the crossings. Preparations for a long 
and perilous journey from Senegal to the Canary Islands (see Maher, this volume), for example, 
reveal the boat captains’ concerns for the safety of their passengers. 
Ayalew (this volume) points to the accumulation of knowledge that is necessary for 
navigating border controls and perilous journeys. Ayalew points to the creation of communities 
of knowledge that involve Eritreans at home, Eritrean diasporas in neighboring (Ethiopia or the 
Sudan) and distant (Europe) countries, and pilots (boat captains) who navigate high danger areas 
and avoiding kidnappings or death. Similarly, Achilli (this volume) points to the hardship shared 
by facilitators and migrants on the road from Turkey to Greece and further north.  
Majidi (this volume) also discusses the role of community ties for Afghans and 
Somalis—two groups that have increasingly sought protection outside their own countries in the 
last decade. The interplay between moral obligation and economic profit and dependence is very 
tight. At the end of the day, the intermediary, the hawala (Afghanistan) or the dahabshiil 
(Somalia), keeps the money until the journey is successfully completed; this guarantees that the 
initial trust is honored and the service is provided. 
Slack and Martinez’s contribution offers an interesting distinction between satisfaction 
with the service and trust in one’s smuggler. While satisfaction with a smuggler is affected by 
the success of the journey, recommending a smuggler to a close relative has more to do with the 
quality of the service en route, including safety (particularly of women) and humane treatment 
than with success or completion of the journey.   
All contributions to this volume point to the sense of moral obligation that these 
smugglers feel toward their customers and to the transnational systems of trust and knowledge 
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that emerge from this obligation. While the policy implications of these findings may not be 
apparent at first glance, the findings do point to the complex role of the migrant smuggler that is 
not reflected in current policies and certainly not in law enforcement and to the need to go 
beyond a criminal justice framework to work with local origin and transit communities.   
Transformation of the smuggling networks  
Several studies have elaborated on the distinctive roles of those involved in smuggling 
networks, distinguishing among local guides and transnational contacts, those who meet people 
at ports or airports or other arrival places and those higher up in the hierarchy who have contacts 
with, for instance, corrupt border guards (Antonopoulos and Winterdyk 2006; Içduygu and 
Toktas 2002; Içduygu 2004; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis 2012). This volume of The ANNALS 
contributes to a more critical and historical view of how migrant smuggling networks were 
formed and how they built on pre-existing local and regional relationships between and within 
communities. Stone-Cadena (this volume) explains how services facilitating international border 
crossing are embedded in historical patterns of movement, trade, and exchange across Ecuador. 
Blanchet argues the same for trans-Saharan crossings.  
However, the tightening of borders and the increase of controls disrupt such patterns and 
lead to the professionalization of smuggling networks. Stone-Cadena and Alvarez-Velasco 
explain how indigenous coyoterismo, based on community relations of interdependence and 
trust, is now transformed into transnational organized crime networks that operate by phone in 
which relationships are impersonal and trust is replaced by dependence and fear. They 
convincingly argue that this change in coyoterismo has resulted because of visa restrictions that 
have stiffened the passage not only to the United States but also through Mexico, Guatemala, and 
Costa Rica, and because of the role assigned to Mexico by the United States as a buffer zone. 
Guevara Gonzalez also shows how these new criminal networks involve both more traditional 
actors, notably local guides who know the terrain, and professional facilitators, the coyotes, who 
arrange the unauthorized border crossing.  
 
Concluding Remarks: Diverting the Flows 
The critical analysis of migrant smuggling that I discuss here and that the articles in this volume 
elucidate, points to the need for a more comprehensive approach to irregular migration and 
asylum seeking; one that avoids categorical distinctions between victims and perpetrators, 
migrants and their smugglers. It also points to the disproportional focus afforded in recent years 
to the criminal activities of smuggling networks and points to how such networks can be the by-
products of the very restrictions that aim to combat them. 
Contributions to this volume of The ANNALS point to a number of important lessons to 
be learned by policy-makers: 
 
• Tightening borders and disrupting local migrant facilitation economies have 
important implications, albeit in the opposite direction than the one desired. Instead 
of discouraging migrants and dismantling smuggling networks, these policies lead to 
migrants investing more money and facing more risks (and often death) along their 
journeys, while the networks become professionalized. Trust and community 
relationships are increasingly replaced by pure profit-seeking and dependence, leading to 




• Border controls and the fight against migrant smuggling need to take into account 
wider regional political and economic processes. For instance, the fall of the Khaddafi 
regime in Libya and the concomitant dismantling of the Libyan oil economy have 
deprived both earlier migrants and natives of their local means of subsistence. Further 
regional economic factors have escaped the radar of European and international policy-
makers, such as the closure of gold mines in Djado and Air mountains in Niger and the 
resulting unemployment of young (and armed) local men (see Brachet in this volume).  
• The war in Syria, conflict in Somalia, oppression in Eritrea, insecurity in 
Afghanistan, inhospitable treatment of Afghans in Iran, poverty and lack of hope in 
Central America, all lead to strong motivations for moving. Such motivations cannot 
be offset by tightening borders and criminalizing smugglers. There is an urgent need to 
work with origin and transit countries so as to (a) develop bilateral schemes for 
temporary or long term employment that would ease migration pressures by providing 
realistic labour migration options for both highly and low skilled migrants (see also 
Triandafyllidou, 2017 on a sectorial approach to labour migration management). Such 
examples have worked for instance in the Mediterranean region between Morocco and 
Spain for employment in the agricultural sector (Gonzalez Enriquez 2013) and also 
between Slovakia and Austria in the care sector (Humer and Hrzenjak 2015);  
(b) to develop information campaigns through the involvement of local associations in 
the countries of origin and transit as to the dangers of irregular migration and migrant 
smuggling and the difficult conditions that migrants will face not only en route but also 
upon arrival (lack of rights, lack of employment, very poor living conditions, risk of 
arrest and expulsion);  
(c) to develop international schemes of responsibility sharing for asylum seekers. The 
emergency quotas for the relocation of asylum seekers among European Union member 
states is a first, partly successful experiment on how to deal with massive arrivals of 
people seeking international protection (European Commission 2017). Perhaps more can 
be learnt from the UN scheme for the Vietnamese boat people in the late 1970s and more 
recently which sough to distribute refugees worldwide (Chetty 2001).   
•  [?/ How? What does it mean for policymakers to “work with origin and transit 
countries…”? What does that look like in real life?  This bullet point and the one below 
highlight a critical policy question that this volume renders beautifully and that you point 
to here: in an increasingly global economy that’s regarded by most as increasingly 
dangerous, how can national / international migration policy effectively respond to what 
seems to be a preponderance of empirical evidence that nations’ attempts to protect their 
interests through border control and militarization seems to not be working?  Can you 
point to an enlightened example of evidence-informed migration policy?  Do you have 
suggestions of your own?] 
• Last, there is a need for a wider understanding of the monetary value of border 
control. The EU and the United States spend millions in fencing and gatekeeping 
(Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini 2011), employing not only border guards but also buying 
expensive border control equipment like infrared cameras, thermic sensors, or radars. In 
addition, they invest a lot of money to build capacity in transit countries in Central 
America as well as in North Africa and the Sahel. Such money does not trickle down to 
the local or national economies. It is often international experts who are employed in 
these offices who will not spend their money locally (see also Brachet 2016). The funds 
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resulting from the EU-Turkey agreement do not address the grievances of cross border 
communities either in southeast or in southwest Turkey that had profited from the 
smuggling business. The investment of Mexican and Moroccan authorities in their border 
control capacity does not help to address the root causes of West African or Central 
American transit flows. Increased enforcement risks only exacerbating the violence of 
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1 The term ‘digital borders’ refers to the increased securitization of passports and visas through the insertion of 
holograms and electronic chips that make them hard to counterfeit. 
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